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Abortion Counselling: Shall Women
be Permitted to Know?
Gerald A. Messerman
I. INTRODUCTION
HE GROWING CONCERN of courts and legislatures with
the wisdom and validity of antiabortion laws has been accom-
panied by an increase in counselling services for women wishing to
terminate unwanted pregnancies. Almost two hundred affiliates
of Planned Parenthood-World
Population, operating through-
THE AUTHOR: GERALD A. M sEERmAN out the country, have entered the
(B.A., LL.B., Western Reserve Univer- abortion counselling field.' The
sity; LL.M., Georgetown University) is
a practicing attorney in Cleveland, Ohio. Clergy Consultation Service,
started in New York in 1967
by a group of ministers and
rabbis, now has some 28 offices in 22 states and employs the services
of over one thousand clergymen. 2  Numerous other groups
throughout the country also provide abortion counselling.8 Unfor-
tunately, persons who participate in abortion counselling have found
their activities to be somewhat hazardous. At least two criminal
prosecutions have already been initiated against clergy counsellors,4
and commercial counselling services have been charged with practic-
ing medicine without a license, unlawful fee splitting, and unlawful
advertising.'
' N.Y. Times, July 1, 1971, at 42, col. 1.
2 Charlton, Abortion Brokers Are Under Study, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1971, at 45,
cols. 1, 3.
3 Counselling services fall into three broad categories. The first would include
services, such as the Clergy Consultation Service, which are noncommercial and which
merely provide a woman with specific information regarding how she can acquire an
abortion. The second category would include those services which provide such in-
formation for a fee, but have no close relationship with the physicians who actually
perform abortions. Such services may or may not operate on a nonprofit basis. The
third category would include services that not only provide information, but also make
specific arrangements for the performance of the abortion. These arrangements may,
and often do, include providing transportation, making direct contact with the physi-
cian, informing the woman of the cost of the abortion, and actually collecting the en-
tire fee for the referral, the transportation and the medical service.
4 One of these cases is Commonwealth v. Hare, ___ Mass. , 280 N.E.2d 138
(1972).
5 See, e.g., State v. Abortion Information Agency, Inc., 37 App. Div. 2d 142 (1971).
See also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4400-03 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
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Moreover, enormous pressure has been generated which, either
intentionally or incidentally, has restricted the dissemination of in-
formation regarding the availability of legal abortions. Referral
agencies have had little success in placing ads in daily metropolitan
newspapers, and when intrepid student editors of college newspapers
have published the names of abortion referral services, the threat of
criminal prosecution has frequently been present. One such student
editor was charged under a Florida law that prohibits the publish-
ing of abortion information, despite the fact that referral services
in Florida are legal.6 When the Concordia College newspaper pub-
lished an advertisement for an abortion clinic in New York, the
president of the college immediately suspended publication of the
newspaper.
7
While the media has effectively blacked-out much information
concerning abortion and abortion referral services, still other limita-
tions on communication have been self-imposed. Planned Parent-
hood associations, for example, are reluctant to engage in public
promotion of their services, believing that such activity does not con-
form to the image Planned Parenthood wishes to create.8 By and
large, however, it is the threat of criminal prosecution and media
policies which have compelled a restrained approach by many of the
counselling services, and particularly by the nonprofit ones.'
In practice, the relatively restricted access to abortion information
has given rise to a number of important consequences. First, infor-
mation regarding abortion services has been largely unavailable to all
except the better informed and more affluent members of the popu-
lation. Second, referral agencies have often failed to provide the
most effective counselling service appropriate to the needs of the
counsellee. 10 And third, because of the unavailability of more con-
G N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1971, at 75, col. 2.
7 N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1970, at 10, col. 8.
8 The reluctance of Planned Parenthood associations to take an aggressive ap-
proach in the abortion counselling field probably derives from the fact that most
affiliate associations are funded by broad-based organizations which include very con-
servative elements.
9 To a substantial extent, the only factor sufficient to overcome the enormous inhibi-
tion created by the threat of criminal prosecution is the desire for profit. The increase
in the number of commercial services is largely a result of the unavailability of abor-
tion information through noncommercial services. During an investigation of com-
mercial agencies, the head of the consumer fraud division of the New York State
Attorney General's Office observed that '[ t ] he commercial agencies are able to oper-
ate because the out-of-state women are ignorant of the same facilities without a fee.'"
Charlton, supra note 2, at 45, col. 3.
10 Thus, for a considerable period of time, the Clergy Consultation Service mini-
mized its contacts with operating physicians for fear that such contacts might enhance
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ventional means of communication, referral services have been ad-
vertised in ways that offend the taste and sensibility of substantial
segments of the population. For a period of time, for example, va-
cationers in Miami Beach could look up to the skies and see a low
flying airplane trailing a banner that read "Abortion Information"
and listed the New York telephone number of a referral agency."
Despite the pervasiveness of such problems and the variety of
legal and practical issues they raise, legal scholars have focused little
attention upon the questions presented. Existing law does provide
significant guidelines for those engaged in abortion counselling. Yet
most counsellors have had substantial difficulty determining precisely
what the law permits or demands.' An exploration of relevant
legal principles should assist in delineating and assessing the nature
and magnitude of the risks involved in abortion counselling. 3
the possibility of successful criminal prosecution. And detailed records were not kept
because of a growing concern that such records may be unprotected by any privilege
and subject to production upon subpoena. Little follow-up work was done because it
was assumed that aggressive counselling would be more susceptible to a claim of active
inducement.
11 Id. Billboards have also been used to advertise the availability of referral ser-
vices.
12The difficulties encountered and questions asked by new counselling services in-
clude the following:
(1) May the service offered be advertised? If it cannot be advertised, what can be
done to make the public aware of the service? If advertising is not permissible for
the purpose of achieving a commercial objective, is it permissible where the objective
is solely humanitarian? Is a greater latitude permitted to those services which are
plainly not conducted for profit?
(2) Do the unauthorized practice of medicine statutes prohibit abortion coun-
selling? In determining whether such services are enjoined by the unauthorized prac-
tice of medicine statutes, is the availability of such services through established pro-
fessional sources a relevant consideration?
(3) Is it improper to give information regarding the availability of legal abor-
tions in a state other than that in which the counsellor is functioning?
(4) How far can the counsellor go in arranging for a legal abortion in a foreign
state without subjecting himself to possible penalties for aiding, inducing, or causing
an abortion in the state in which he operates?
(5) Is there some legal wisdom in limiting the counsellor's contact with the per-
son who actually performs the abortion?
(6) If the abortion is unlawful where rendered, what risks are encountered by the
counsellor?
(7) Are communications received by the counsellor privileged?
13 This article will not examine the constitutional challenges to current abortion
laws. For a thorough discussion of those constitutional problems, see Lucas, Federal
Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement and Administration of State Abortion
Statutes, 46 N.C.L. REV. 730 (1968). For an excellent discussion of the moral, social,
religious, psychological, and economic issues relevant to the entire abortion question,
see D. CALLAHAN, ABORTION: LAW, CHOICE AND MoRALITY (1970).
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IL THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
One of the government's principal means for restricting abor-
tion counselling is the criminal proscription of advertising and dis-
semination of abortion information. 4 The Supreme Court has not
yet considered the validity of statutes which limit the public's access
to abortion information,'15 but it is clear that such laws must be as-
14 Several state and federal statutes restrict the right to dispense information regard-
ing abortions. An example, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970), declares the following to be
"nonmailable matter" which "shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from
any post office by any letter carrier:"
Every article or thing designed, adapted, or intended for producing abor-
tion, or for any indecent or immoral use; and
Every article, instrument, substance, drug, medicine, or thing which is ad-
vertised or described in a manner calculated to lead another to use or apply
it for producing abortion, or for any indecent or immoral purpose; and
Every written or printed card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertise-
ment or notice of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly, where,
or how, or from whom, or by what means any of such mentioned matters,
articles, or things may be obtained or made, or where or by whom any act or
operation of any kind for the procuring or producing of abortion will be
done or performed, or how or by what means abortion may be produced,
whether sealed or unsealed ....
The penalty for violating this section is substantial - 5 thousand dollars and/or 5
years for the first offense and 10 thousand dollars and/or 10 years for each subsequent
offense. The comprehensive prohibition and severe penalties contained in section 1461
are not unique to federal law. Virtually all states which have sought to prohibit dis-
semination of information regarding how to acquire an abortion have enacted equally
comprehensive prohibitions. See generally George, The Evolving Law of Abortions, 23
CASE W. RES. L REV. 708 (1972).
It should be noted that many, if not most, of these statutory limitations are on ad-
vertising. Counselling itself is not generally prohibited in such statutes.
-5 Recent decisions however, have suggested some possible guidelines. In Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 40 U.S.LW. 4303 (U.S. March 22, 1972), the Court, on equal protec-
tion grounds, invalidated a Massachusetts statute which prohibited distribution of con-
traceptive devices to anyone but married persons. The Court concluded that there
was no rational basis for affording different treatment to married persons than was af-
forded unmarried persons. Although the state might have a legitimate interest in pro-
tecting the health, safety, and morals of the community by discouraging sexual promis-
cuity among unmarried persons, the Court questioned whether that was the intended
purpose of the statute: "Even on the assumption that the fear of pregnancy operates as
a deterrent to fornication the Massachusetts statute is ... so riddled with exceptions that
deterrence of pre-marital sex cannot reasonably be regarded as its aim." Id. at 4307.
The Court did not decide whether the Massachusetts statute might be upheld "simply
as a prohibition on contraception," deferring resolution of that question with the ob-
servation that "whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may
be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike." Id. at 4308.
The relevance of Baird to the issues involved in abortion counselling is apparent.
First, while the Court did not decide the constitutional arguments involved in the
abortion controversy, it reaffirmed its commitment to the proposition that decisions re-
garding procreation should be left to the individual: "If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id. The term "unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion" awaits interpretation, but the Court does insist that the same stan-
dard be applied with respect to single persons as is applied in determining the rights
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sessed in the context of first amendment principles. Appraisal of
the constitutionality of limitations on advertising requires examina-
tion of two distinct but interrelated interests - the counsellor's
right to speak, and the counsellee's right to hear and know.
A. The Right of the Counsellor to Inform
A preliminary inquiry concerning referral and counselling activ-
ities is whether the activity constitutes speech and is thus granted
the protection of the first amendment, or whether the activity is
conduct that is unprotected by the first amendment. 16 Counselling
limited to the distribution of general information concerning abor-
tions and specific information concerning the procurement of legal
abortions is clearly speech.17  When the counsellor actually ar-
ranges for performance of the abortion, however, his activity may
well go beyond pure speech and become action which is beyond
the protection of the first amendment. 8
Where the counselling agency's activity falls within the realm of
speech, any restrictions upon such activity can be constitutional only
of married persons. A second important implication of Baird arises out of the Court's
unwillingness (criticized by Chief Justice Burger) to accept at face value the state's as-
sertion that legislation affecting exercise of the right to determine whether children will
be born can be justified on the ground that such legislation is necessary to protect and
promote public morality. Any such claim will be subjected to probing judicial scrutiny
where the fundamental right of privacy is infringed upon.
36 The first amendment protects speech, but not action that goes beyond speech.
See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 303-04 (1940).
[T]he theory [underlying the first amendment] rests upon a fundamental dis-
tinction between belief, opinion and communication of ideas on the one hand,
and different forms of conduct on the other. For shorthand purposes we refer
to this distinction hereafter as one between "expression" and "action." [I]n
order to achieve its desired goals, a society or the state is entitled to exercise
control over action - whether by prohibiting or compelling it - on an en-
tirely different and vastly more extensive basis. But expression occupies a
specially protected position. In this sector of human conduct, the social right
of suppression or compulsion is at its lowest point, in most respects nonexis-
tent. T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 6 (1966).
17 See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969), where the Court reversed a con-
viction under a flag desecration statute. Compare Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), with United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968) and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
18But see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), where the Court indi-
cated that speech, when mixed with "non-speech," may still be protected to some ex-
tent by the first amendment. Id. at 376. In any event, if the counsellor merely
arranges or helps to arrange for a legal abortion, the due process clause of the 14th
amendment would afford him some protection from criminal prosecution, for a state
may not make criminal conduct which is no more than the facilitating of a legal act.
See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262, 265 (1963).
ABORTION COUNSELING
upon a showing of a compelling state interest. This conclusion fol-
lows from a long series of cases in which the Supreme Court
has held that where fundamental personal liberties are involved,
they may not be abridged by the states simply on a showing that a
regulatory statute has some rational relationship to the effectuation
of a proper state purpose. "Where there is significant encroach-
ment upon personal liberty, the state may prevail only upon show-
ing a subordinating interest which is compelling." Bates v. Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524. The law must be shown "necessary, and
not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible
state policy." McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196.19
If a counselling service were merely to provide information re-
garding the circumstances in which an abortion could be lawfully
procured in the state in which the service was operating, it is dif-
ficult to conceive of any legitimate basis for inhibiting the dissemin-
ation of such information. Thus, the communication would consti-
tute protected first amendment expression. It would not fall within
any of the areas of expression which may be regulated by the state:
there would be no incitement of others to commit unlawful acts;2"
no utterance of inflammatory words;21 no danger of shocking those
who might be exposed to the words uttered;22 and no obscenity.2
The same result should obtain where the counselling service
provides similar information on the availability of abortions that are
legal only in states other than the one in which the service is operat-
ing. Although a stronger state interest might arguably exist in this
situation, it is doubtful that the state's interest would rise to the
compelling nature required to warrant a restriction upon first amend-
ment rights. Indeed, one federal court so concluded in the case of
Mitchell Family Planning, Inc. v. City of Royal Oak.24  Mitchell
held unconstitutional a municipal ordinance which prohibited bill-
board advertising of any information concerning the procuring of
an abortion. The court reasoned that "the City of Royal Oak has
insufficient interest in an abortion to be performed in another state
to warrant [such a] limitation of speech."25
Thus, where the agency's services do not include the actual ar-
19 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring).
20 See Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
21 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
2 2 See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S.
503 (1969); Benson v. Rich, 448 F.2d 1371 (10th Cir. 1971).
2 3 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
24 335 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
25 Id. at 743.
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rangement of the abortion operation, it appears that a state could not
meet the burden necessary to curtail the solely informational nature
of the service. An even stronger case for this proposition can be
made by examining the counselee's, or the public's, right to know.
B. The Counsellee's Right to be Informed
That the first amendment protects more than the right to speak
is a proposition most recently relied upon by the Supreme Court in
invalidating a statute which prohibited the possession of pornograph-
ic literature: "It is now well established that the Constitution pro-
tects the right to receive information and ideas . . . , regardless of
their social worth, [and that this right] is fundamental to our free so-
ciety." 6 The public's right to receive information is a right of in-
creasing prominence in contemporary America. It has been relied
upon not only to protect an individual's right to possess pornograph-
ic materials, but also to justify publication of important classified
government documents, 27 to bar prosecution of an agency advertis-
ing Mexican divorces,28 and in a variety of other instances.
Within the context of the first amendment balancing test, the
importance of the need for access to particular information is criti-
cal in determining whether there is a protected right to acquire such
information. That factor should entitle dissemination of abortion
2 6 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). A somewhat anomalous situa-
tion has been created by the decisions in Stanley and Griswold. Stanley, for example,
establishes that the right to possess pornographic literature is protected by the concept
of privacy implicit in the first amendment. On the other hand, acquisition of porno-
graphic literature is rendered rather difficult by numerous decisions upholding the right
of the government to regulate the sale of pornographic literature. E.g., Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Likewise, the Court in Griswold rejected a prohibition
against the use of contraceptive devices by married persons as an unwarranted inva-
sion of marital privacy protected by the penumbra of the first amendment. The
Court also held, in Griswold, that professional persons who prescribed the use of con-
traceptives for married persons had standing to assert the privacy interest of those per-
sons and that they could not be convicted as aiders and abettors in light of the fact
that the principal offense was unconstitutionally defined. Thus, the right of married
persons to use contraceptives has been raised to constitutional dignity. And the right to
prescribe such use has found incidental protection. But the Court has yet to determine
whether a state may legitimately prohibit the sale of contraceptive devices to married
and unmarried persons alike. As with pornography, the right to possess and use is
protected, but, as yet, not the right to acquire. If sale is prohibited, of course, acquisi-
tion is rendered very difficult.
The principle that the first amendment protects the right to know and receive infor-
mation and ideas has long been recognized by the Court. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964);
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
27 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
2 8 Hiett v. United States, 415 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1969).
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information to a high degree of constitutional protection. The need
to be informed of facts concerning abortion is at least as great to
those seeking such information as is the need of others to possess
pornographic material or to acquire information concerning Mexi-
can divorces. Women concerned with terminating an unwanted
pregnancy desperately desire information regarding how to do so,
and whether a legal abortion is secured or not can be a question of
extraordinary impact in a woman's life.29 Indeed, the intensity with
which a woman will search for an abortion, the urgency of the
search, and the tragic frustration and indignities frequently encoun-
tered have been related by many.
The right to know is an integral aspect of the first amendment,
and protection of that right requires that restrictions upon the dis-
semination of abortion information be struck down unless a state
can demonstrate compelling reasons for such restrictions. Because
such information does not fall within the categories of expression
which heretofore have been validly regulated or prohibited, it is
doubtful that a state could meet this burden. Furthermore, if the
right to have an abortion is deemed a fundamental right, the right
to know in the context of abortion counselling would assume an
added dimension. Any restriction upon the dissemination of abor-
tion information would infringe upon the right to abortion, and
could therefore be justified only under the most limited circum-
stances, if any.30
C. Advertising Abortion Information
It may be of little solace to those involved in abortion counsel-
ling to know that the dissemination of abortion information is pro-
tected by the first amendment if the advertising of their services is
not similarly protected. Nonetheless, this may be the case in certain
instances. Relying on the commercial sector doctrine, courts have
frequently held that advertisements and solicitations do not enjoy
the protection of the first amendment. The commercial sector doc-
trine has its genesis in Valentine v. Chrestensen,3' where the Su-
preme Court held that distribution of advertising handbills intended
solely for a commercial purpose might legitimately be prohibited.
In the words of the Court,
29 See generally Schwartz, Abortion on Request: The Psychiatric Implications, 23
CASE W. REs. L REv. 840, (1972).
30 Ct. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
31316 U.S. 52 (1942).
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the streets are proper places for the exercise of the freedom of
communicating information and disseminating opinions and . . .
though the states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the
privilege in the public interest, they may not unduly burden or
proscribe its employment in these public thoroughfares. (It is]
equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on gov-
ernment as respects purely commercial advertising. Whether, and
to what extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation
in the streets and to what extent such activities shall be judged a
derogation of the public right of the user, are matters for legisla-
tive judgment.32
Many of the statutes which inhibit counselling activity"3 are
written as restrictions on advertising. Should the commercial sec-
tor doctrine be invoked to uphold such statutes, the effectiveness of
otherwise legal referral agencies would be seriously impaired. It is
possible, however, that the statutory restrictions on advertising will
not receive the judicial deference that would ensue from a rigid ap-
plication of the commercial sector doctrine, particularly when the
agencies in question operate on a nonprofit basis.
Courts have gone to great lengths to distinguish communication
by professionals to their clients, from aggressive, commercially moti-
vated communication designed to promote the sale of particular
goods or services. A case in point is Planned Parenthood Com-
mittee v. Maricopa County,34 where the Supreme Court of Arizona
rejected a constitutional challenge to a statute which prohibited the
publication of "a notice or advertisement of any medicine or means
for producing or facilitating a miscarriage or abortion, or for pre-
vention of conception ... ."35 In upholding the Arizona statute,
the court read the term "publishes a notice or advertisement" to ap-
ply only to an open appeal to the general public. General literature
dealing with the population problem was held to be outside the
proscription of the statute. Also excepted were such materials as
"[a]rticles and press releases in newspapers and periodicals, includ-
ing editorials, commentaries, and informational articles on matters
of current public interest . 3...6 The statute would not apply, the
32 Id. at 54.
33 Cf. note 14 supra.
34 92 Ariz. 231, 375 P.2d 719 (1962).
35 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-213 (1956).
Relying upon this provision, a county medical director instructed that distribution
by the county health department of all information regarding birth control be terminated
immediately, and the Planned Parenthood affiliate, a nonprofit corporation concerned
with the dissemination of information which would permit parents to plan their fam-
ilies, ceased distribution of literature dealing with contraception and birth control.
36 92 Ariz. at 237, 375 P.2d at 723.
ABORTION COUNSELING
court held, to "the dissemination of birth control information by a
doctor to his patient, or by the Planned Parenthood Committee to
those who seek such information from them .... This exception
arises from the fact that "person-to-person consultation" would not
be considered advertising. But if information describing the use
and application of particular contraceptive devices were made avail-
able to the general public, "this would amount to advertising and
fall within the prohibitive terms of the statute."38
The Arizona court distinguished between referrals by physicians
to Planned Parenthood that were made "to persons who . . . , of
their own accord, sought birth control information from the re-
ferring party" 9 and referrals made in the course of the physician's
treatment of the patient, from aggressive solicitation of referrals "by
the employment of touters or canvassers. "40 The latter type of ag-
gressive solicitation would constitute advertising, but the former,
professional referrals would not.
Given this construction of the statute, the constitutional chal-
lenge was dismissed by the court in summary fashion. The court
concluded that the law did "not prohibit the public discussion or
advocacy of the general ideas which plaintiff [sought] to pro-
mote," 41 that it imposed no prior restraint upon the exercise of
speech, and that it did not limit person-to-person conversation. The
restriction in the statute was considered to be very limited: "The
only limitation ... is that plaintiff may not advertise, in the sense of
publicly advocating, specific trade branded devices or preparations in
the contraceptive field."42  Suggesting that advertising "does not
enjoy the same degree of protection under the first amendment as do
other noncommercial forms of idea expression, ' 43 the court found
no defect in this limitation.
Furthermore, the court declared that the validity of any re-
straint upon the exercise of speech must be determined by balanc-
ing "the state's interest in the welfare and safety of its citizens
against the individual's interest in free speech and the degree of im-
pairment of this freedom caused by the governmental regulation. '44
371Id.
38 Id. at 238, 375 P.2d at 724.
39 Id.
40d.
411d. at 239, 375 P.2d at 725.
421d. at 239-40, 375 P.2d at 725.
43 Id. at 240, 375 P.2d at 725.
441d. at 241, 375 P.2d at 726.
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To implement this balancing test, the court inquired whether there
was any reasonable public interest which would justify the limita-
tions upon expression imposed by the statute. Such a justification
was found to exist in the state's objective of protecting the health
and morals of the community by restricting sexual activity among
unmarried persons. Considering the importance of this objective
and the historical regulation of advertising that has been tolerated
against first amendment challenges, the statutory proscription was
deemed acceptable.
This approach to the advertising statutes - while potentially
affording more protection to the abortion counsellor than would a
rigid application of the commercial sector doctrine - is still a seri-
ous impediment to those who desire counselling but do not know
where it is available. A different and more realistic approach to the
advertising issue was taken in Mitchell Family Planning, Inc. v.
City of Royal Oak4" where the court struck down a municipal ordi-
nance prohibiting billboard advertising of abortion information.
The nonprofit Mitchell Family Planning Agency had rented bill-
board space and put up an advertisement reading:
Abortion Information
Male and Female Sterilization Information
Mitchell Family Planning Incorporated
Niagara Falls, New York. Phone No.
716-285-9133. Local Phone No. 358-4672.46
In response to the agency's request for an injunction restraining en-
forcement of the municipal ordinance, the court held that the ordi-
nance was impermissibly broad because it seemed to prohibit adver-
tising which could result in legal abortions as well as illegal ones.
The court did not suggest that Mitchell's form of advertising was
subject to any different tests than were other forms of expression.
Then, because there was no indication that contacting the agency
would imminently result in an illegal abortion, the court concluded
that there was no clear and present danger that a substantive evil
which the city had the power to prohibit would take place.47  Ac-
cordingly, no limitation of speech was justified.
While it remains to be seen what test is applied to advertising
by nonprofit groups, a different test might well be applied to adver-
45 335 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
461d. at 739.
471d. at 742.
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tising by for-profit agencies as judicial hostility to money-making ac-
tivities in the abortion field is manifested. Although there is a cer-
tain dilution of first amendment protections when the balancing
test is applied,48 its utilization would still be preferable to reliance
on the commercial sector doctrine - for under the balancing test
it is possible that advertising even by commercial agencies will find
an adequate measure of protection.
A recent case involving advertisements for Mexican divorces in-
dicates how the public's right to acquire information may be bal-
anced against the governmental power to regulate commercial solic-
itation. In Hiett v. United States,49 the defendant was convicted
of using the mails to distribute written material "giving or offering
to give information concerning where or how or through whom a
divorce may be secured in a foreign country, and designed to solicit
business in connection with the procurement thereof."50 On appeal,
the Government urged that this provision was a constitutionally
permissible regulation of activity which went beyond the kind of
expression protected by the first amendment. Solicitation, the Gov-
ernment argued, "is not a form of speech entitled to First Amend-
ment protection, just as obscene, abusive language, and threats of
fighting words are not protected."'" The court rejected this con-
tention and held that even purely commercial expression was entitled
to some degree of first amendment protection.
The test to be applied, according to Hiett, is the same one used
where courts are confronted with the validity of restraints upon ex-
pression which involve more than speech. Where speech is com-
bined with conduct for the purpose of achieving communication,
the court noted, such "nonpure" speech is afforded protection mea-
sured by balancing "the harm done by the overbreadth and vague-
ness of the statute against the legitimate interests the legislature
was seeking to protect" 52 to determine whether the latter "are so
overwhelming as to justify the encroachment. 53
That the same test should be applied to commercial expression
is the ultimate conclusion reached by the court: "[Cjases show that
when speech is coupled with solicitation, as it is in the expression
[the statute) prohibits, it is no longer pure speech and it is to be
4 8 See T. EmsoN, supra note 16, at 53-56.
49 415 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1969).
50 See 18 U.S.C. § 1714 (1970).
51415 F.2d at 669.
52 Id. at 672.
53Id. See also Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
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tested by the balancing approach."'  Applying the balancing test
to the commercial expression involved in solicitation of foreign di-
vorce business, the court concluded that the statutory prohibition
was intolerably broad, that the information it sought to remove
from the public domain related to matters of great social importance,
and that the Government's interest - the desire to preserve fam-
ily integrity - could be achieved in a more reasonable way."'
The analogy is obvious between an interdiction against mailing
information designed to solicit foreign divorce business and a pro-
hibition against advertisements and dissemination of information re-
garding the availability of abortions in or outside of the state in
which the information is distributed. If the information dis-
pensed by the counselling service relates to lawful means of secur-
ing an abortion, it should not come within the state's legitimate
power to bar expression which incites others to unlawful conduct.
Furthermore, if the importance of the information to the public is
realistically considered, it is likely that the purported governmental
interest in prohibiting the advertising or dissemination of abortion
information will prove inadequate to justify such a prohibition.
Simplistic application of the ill-defined and ambiguous com-
mercial sector doctrine would clearly yield a far less desirable result.
But the exclusion under that doctrine of commercial advertising
from the protection of the first amendment cannot withstand anal-
ysis. The illogic of conditioning first amendment rights upon the
motivating force impelling a particular expression is rather apparent.
Any number of cases, for example, have recognized that newspapers,
although profit-making businesses, are entitled to first amendment
protection.56 Similarly, picketing may be engaged in primarily for
the purpose of achieving economic gain, but this fact does not place
picketing outside the ambit of the first amendment." And a book
dealer, despite his profit motivation, retains first amendment protec-
tion: "It is . . .no matter that the dissemination [of books] takes
place under commercial auspices.''58 Thus, the doctrine that com-
mercial communication is outside the system of protected expres-
sion has been employed to justify controls over commercial adver-
54 415 F.2d at 672.
551d. at 671-73.
56 See, e.g., Chicago Joint Board, Amalgamated Workers of America v. Chicago
Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970); The Associates and Aldrich Co. v. Times-
Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971).
57 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
58 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959).
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tising, 9 but the simplistic analysis which suggests that the first
amendment becomes irrelevant upon a finding of commercialism
does not withstand scrutiny.
Indeed, the commercial sector doctrine has little to commend it.
It assumes that the motivation behind expression is different where
the expression may be characterized as political, social, or literary, as
opposed to expression which is crassly commercial. This assumption
is simply not supported by fact.
The profit motive should make no difference, for that is an ele-
ment inherent in the very conception of a press under our system
of free enterprise. Those who make their living through exercise
of First Amendment rights are no less entitled to its protection
than those whose advocacy or promotion is not hitched to a prof-
it motive.60
Moreover, the commercial sector doctrine implicitly assumes that
those who communicate information by way of advertising are of-
fering facts less important to the public than is the information con-
veyed in noncommercial expression. This assumption also does not
withstand scrutiny. It would be difficult to find, for example, in-
formation more intensely desired and more immediately relevant
to a woman's life than the abortion information offered by coun-
selling services. If there is to be a free flow of information re-
garding matters of great public importance and if that information
cannot flow through noncommercial channels of communication,
alternative, commercial channels must be established and must be
granted constitutional protection if the information is to find its
way into the public domain.
Thus, to determine whether abortion advertising is protected
first amendment activity, a number of different questions must be
considered. First, is the counselling activity engaged in for com-
mercial gain? Second, is the counselling activity advertised in a pub-
lic manner? Third, what alternative means of gaining access to in-
formation are available to the public? And fourth, is the coun-
selling service disseminating information dealing solely with legal
abortion procedures? Where the counselling service is conducted
for profit, the commercial sector doctrine may be applicable for it
still has vitality in the courts, as ill-founded as it may be. At worst,
59 See, e.g., American Medicinal Products Inc .v. FrC, 136 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1943).
60 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring).
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application of the doctrine would exclude the counselling activity
from first amendment protection. But more realistically, the valid-
ity of limitations upon the dissemination of information by a com-
mercial counselling service would be evaluated by application of a
balancing test only slightly different from that which is applied to
restrictions upon other communication activities. And when non-
profit or noncommercial agencies are involved, traditional first
amendment principles indicate that there would be little justifica-
tion for restrictions.
III. COUNSELLING AS AIDING, ABETTING,
OR INDUCEMENT OF ABORTION
A. Culpability as an Accomplice of the Abortionist
One of the problems that concerns abortion counselling and
referral agencies is whether a counsellor who gives information lead-
ing to the performance of an illegal abortion may be convicted as
an aider and abettor or as an accessory before the fact." This issue
was raised in Commonwealth v. Hare62 in the prosecution of a
clergyman who provided information to a woman seeking an abor-
tion. In an indictment filed in 1969 in Middlesex County, Mas-
sachusetts, the clergyman was charged with abortion. 3  The in-
61 The common law divided guilty parties into principals and accessories; principals
being those persons who actually perpetrated the offense, and accessories being those who
contributed to the offense but did not actually perform the felonious act. See 1 M.
HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 612-21 (2d ed. 1800); R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIM-
INAL LAW 643-48 (2d ed. 1969). Accessories were of three types: (1) before the fact;,
(2) at the fact (commonly called aiders and abettors); and (3) after the fact. While
the distinctions of guilt between principals and accessories at or before the fact have
been largely abolished by statute, and all are charged and punishable as principals
(see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), the common law definitions are still pertinent in as-
sessing whether one can be charged as an accessory. Thus, an accessory before the
fact is one who, though absent at the commission of the felony, procures, counsels,
commands, induces, or advises another to commit the felony. 1 F. WHARTON, CRIM-
INAL LAW § 263 (11th ed. 1912).
An aider and abettor is one who is present, either actually or constructively, and
who (with mens tea) either assists the perpetrator in the commission of the crime, stands
by with intent (known to the perpetrator) to render aid if needed, or commands, coun-
sels, or otherwise encourages the perpetrator to commit the crime. R. PERKINS, supra
at 645; F. WHARTON, supra at § 245.
An accessory after the fact is one who in no way is tainted with guilt of a crime when
perpetrated, but who, with full knowledge of the facts, thereafter conceals the offender
or gives him some assistance to save him from detection, arrest, trial, or punishment.
R. PERKINS, supra, at 646; F. WHARTON, supra, at § 281.
62 Commonwealth v. Hare, ___ Mass. _, 280 N.E.2d 138 (1972).
63 MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 274, § 2 (1970) provides: "Whoever aids in the
commission of a felony, or is an accessory thereto before the fact by counselling, hiring
or otherwise procuring such felony to be committed, shall be indicted, tried and pun-
ished as a principal."
ABORTION COUNSELING
dictment alleged that the minister, "with intent to procure the mis-
carriage of ... [one woman], did aid or assist [another] in unlaw-
fully using an instrument or other means upon the body of . . .
[the woman]."" A bill of particulars was filed in which the com-
monwealth alleged that the minister, knowing that he was in viola-
tion of the laws of Massachusetts, "instructed" the woman and her
companion to proceed to the alleged abortionist, "knowing he was
an unlicensed physician," for the purpose of having him perform
an unlawful abortion.6 5
A motion to dismiss the indictment was filed on the ground that
the indictment and bill of particulars did not charge an offense un-
der the laws of Massachusetts. The trial judge granted the motion
to dismiss, stating:
I do not regard the use of the word 'instructed', in the Bill of
Particulars as implying that the defendant directed, advised, or in-
duced... [the woman] to proceed to Brunelle, the alleged abor-
tionist. An inspection of the evidence... before the Grand Jury
confirms this view. In plain language, the defendant informed...
[the woman] of the telephone number and address of Brunelle as
one who would perform an abortion for $400. From the facts al-
leged in the Bill of Particulars and the reasonable inferences which
may be drawn therefrom, no more can be concluded than that ...[the woman] sought out the defendant, seeking information as to
an abortion, and that the defendant furnished her with the name,
address, and telephone number of the alleged abortionist, and theprice. There is no evidence of any connection or communication
between the defendant and Brunelle.66
The trial judge further pointed out that essential facts were missing
from the commonwealth's case that would be necessary to find Hare
guilty as an accessory. Namely, there had been no showing of
"an association of the defendant with the venture or that he par-
ticipated in it as in something that he wished to bring about and
that he sought, by his action, to make it succeed. ' 67
On appeal from the trial judge's order granting dismissal, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed the lower court,
but for reasons not really pertinent to the ultimate question of
whether Hare's conduct was criminal. The court held that the dis-
missal order should have been denied because the indictment (con-
sidered without reference to the bill of particulars) adequately
__ Mass. at __ 280 N.Y.2d at 140 n.4.
65 Id. at ___, 280 N.E.2d at 139.
66 Id. (emphasis added).
671d.
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charged a crime.6 8 But the supreme judicial court did provide dic-
turn favorable to Hare's position:
If the bill of particulars in the instant case in fact presents the
total extent of the Commonwealth's proof, we think, without so
deciding, that the allowance of a motion for a directed verdict
might well be required at the conclusion of the Commonwealth's
opening statement or at the dose of the Commonwealth's case.69
Thus, although the trial judge erred procedurally in granting the
defendant's motion, the supreme court apparently agreed in sub-
stance with the judge's conclusion that Hare's conduct did not make
him culpable as an accessory.
Since remand, the Hare case has not yet followed its full course,
but it does point out a critical problem which must be considered by
all abortion counselling services in determining the manner in
which they will operate. The Cleveland Consultation Service -
of which Hare was a member - had been functioning before legal
abortions were widely available in a number of states without con-
cern for whether an abortion was necessary to preserve the life or
health of the woman. Referrals were made to persons believed to
be licensed physicians by the Consultation Service, although an ef-
fort was made to minimize the contact between the doctors and the
Consultation Service on advice of counsel that this procedure would
reduce exposure to criminal prosecution. The particular physician
involved in the Hare case, as the facts developed, had lost his li-
cense as a consequence of an earlier abortion conviction. Conse-
quently, the illegality of the abortion in Massachusetts was indis-
putable.70 But there had been no actual contact by the minister-
defendant and the unlicensed physician; no fee had been charged
for the service by the minister; and no effort had been made by
the minister to encourage the woman to have an abortion. Upon
these facts, the question of whether or not the abortion counsellor
could be convicted of being an accessory can be resolved on the ba-
sis of established legal principles.
68 The error of the lower court was in considering facts alleged in the bill of par-
ticulars as limiting the commonwealth's indictment. The proper procedure, held the
supreme court, was to look solely to the allegations in the indictment. The allegations
in the Hare case (which were merely a general rephrasing of the criminal statute)
were deemed adequate once the bill of particulars was ignored.
69 Id. at __, 280 N.E.2d at 143.
70 If an abortion were legal (either because it was not proscribed by statute or be-
cause a proscriptive statute was unconstitutional), one presumably could not be charged
with aiding and abetting. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262, 265
(1963).
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A classic case concerning the requisites of culpability as an ac-
cessory is United States v. Peoni7 1 where Judge Learned Hand artic-
ulated the applicable standards in language that won approval in
numerous subsequent decisions.72  After reviewing statutory and
common law history concerning the definitions and tests for deter-
mining whether one is guilty as an accessory, Judge Hand stated:
It will be observed that all [the accepted] definitions have nothing
whatever to do with the probability that the forbidden result would
follow upon the accessory's conduct; and that they all demand that
he in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he partici-
pate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he
seek by his action to make it succeed. All the words used - even
the most colorless, "abet" - carry an implication of purposive at-
titude towards it.73
In Peoni, the court reversed a conviction on a charge of counter-
feiting where guilt was predicated on the assertion that the defen-
dant had acted as an accessory before the fact.74 Judge Hand found
that the defendant's conduct "was indeed a step in the causal chain
which ended in [the prindpal's] possession [of counterfeit bills],"
but it was nothing more.75  The court thus rejected the "but-for"
test as a means of determining whether evidence is sufficient to es-
tablish guilt: even if the Government could prove that the sub-
stantive offense would not have occurred without the participation
of the alleged accessory, that in itself would not be sufficient to sup-
port conviction.76
Further guidance as to the risks involved in abortion counselling
can be found in Morei v. United States,77 where a Government agent
had sought to obtain narcotics from a physician. The physician did
not give the agent the drugs, but he "did give the name of defendant
Morei, and his address in Cleveland and told [the agent) to see
71 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938).
72 See, e.g., Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949); Morei v.
United States, 127 .2d 827, 831 (6th Cir. 1942).
73 100 F.2d at 402. The same test was articulated by the Supreme Court in Nye &
Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949), where the Court, quoting Judge
Hand, stated: "In order to aid and abet another to commit a crime it is necessary that a
defendant 'in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in
something he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed."
74 Peoni had sold counterfeit bills to one Regno; and Regno sold the same bills to
one Dorsey. All three knew the bills were counterfeit and Dorsey was arrested while
trying to pass the bills. The issue, then, was whether Peoni was guilty as an accessory
to Dorsey's possession of the bills. 100 .2d at 401.
75 Id. at 403.
76 Id. at 402-03.
77 127 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1942).
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Morei and tell him [the physician] had sent [the agent] and that
'he'll take care of you.' "781 When Morei subsequently sold the nar-
cotics to the agent, the physician was charged and convicted as an
accessory to the sale, but his conviction was overturned on appeal.
Because there had been no showing that the physician had any
stake in the venture,79 the appellate court would not permit an in-
ference of the necessary interest in the outcome of the principal's
criminal acts."0 In evaluating the relationship shown by the evi-
dence, the court observed: "This is not the purposive association
with the venture that ...brings [the physician3 within the com-
pass of the crime of purchasing or selling narcotics, either as princi-
pal, aider and abettor, or accessory before the fact."'..
A similar decision was rendered by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals in United States v. Moses," where the evidence demon-
strated that the defendant introduced certain persons, at their re-
quest, to a seller of narcotics. The defendant had vouched for the
buyers and a purchase was made. Nonetheless, the court found
"[tihere was nothing to show that [the defendant] was associated
in any way with the enterprise of the seller or that she had any per-
sonal or financial interest in bringing trade to him."8" Thus, "[ail-
though appellant's conduct was prefatory to the sale, it was not col-
laborative with the seller. For this reason, the conviction [could
not] be sustained. 8.4
Transposing the principles developed in the cases described above
to the typical abortion counselling situation, one can draw certain
tentative conclusions. First, if the counsellor is not actually acting
in concert with the abortionist, the probability of conviction as an
78Id. at 829-30.
79 The Court stated:
There was no evidence that Dr. Platt planned with the other defendants or con-
spired directly or indirectly with them . . . There was no community of
scheme between [them) ... nor was there any prearrangement or concert of ac-
tion. Dr. Platt was payed nothing and it is not claimed that he ... expected to
receive anything from the claimed transaction. Id. at 831.
80 Like Judge Hand in the Peoni case, the Moroi court also rejected the "but-for"
test, stating that to accept such a standard "would open a vast field of offenses that have
never been contemplated within the common law by aiding, abetting, inducing or pro-
curing." Id. at 831.
81 Id. at 832. Nor could the physician be convicted of aiding and abetting the
government agent, Beach. As the court remarked: "Giving Beach the name of Morei,
under the circumstances of this case, and with no further connection with the offense,
would not render Dr. Platt guilty of aiding and abetting Beach, or of being his acces-
sory before the fact." Id.
82 220 F.2d 166 (3d Cit. 1955).
83 Id. at 168.
84 Id.
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aider and abettor or accessory before the fact is diminished. Sec-
ond, if the counsellor is not profiting by the act of the abortionist,
courts are apt to hold that he does not have a sufficient stake in
the outcome of the venture to support a conviction. And third,
where the counsellor either encouraged an abortion or had a per-
sonal interest in securing an abortion, the probability of a sustain-
able conviction is substantially increased.
Some of these tentative conclusions find direct support in the
present case law. For example, in Scott v. State,85 the Supreme
Court of Delaware held that "the furnishing of the name of the
person who later committed the abortion [is not] sufficient to con-
vict one of aiding, abetting or procuring an abortion."86  In Scott,
the defendant secured the name and address of the abortionist and
accompanied the patient to the apartment of the abortionist knowing
that she intended to have an abortion performed. Despite these
facts, the evidence was held insufficient to convict.8 7
On the other hand, if the evidence tends to support an inference
of concerted action between the party making the referral and the
person performing the abortion, the hazard of conviction is great.
So, in State v. Ellrich,88 conviction was sustained upon evidence dem-
onstrating that the defendant-physician was contacted for the pur-
pose of performing an abortion; that he gave the name and tele-
phone number of the abortionist to the woman seeking the abortion;
and that he told her to call from a certain pay phone and to say that
she was calling from a particular address, rather than use the defen-
dant's name. These peculiar instructions, held the Supreme Court
of New Jersey, showed a "prearranged code" between the defen-
dant and the principal and "spell out quite dearly and convincingly
a criminal concert of action."8 9
A personal interest, sufficient to establish guilt as an aider and
abettor, may be found where the defendant seeks to bring about
the abortion for personal reasons. Thus, in Commonwealth v. Don-
85 49 Del. 251, 113 A.2d 880 (1955).
88 Id. at 255, 113 A.2d at 882.
8 7 A similar conclusion was reached in People v. Northcot, 45 Cal. App. 706, 189
P. 704 (1920), where a physician who refused to perform an abortion gave his patient
the name of a physician who did perform the abortion.
88 10 N.J. 146,89 A.2d 685 (1952).
89 Id. at 150, 89 A.2d at 687. See also McLure v. State, 214 Ark. 159, 215 S.W.2d
524 (1948) (concert of action established upon evidence that defendant-physician re-
ferred woman to another doctor for an abortion, that he stated "he had sent a million
over there," that he instructed the woman to return to him for treatment, and that the
woman returned to the defendant when the operation was completed).
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oghue,9 ° the fact that the person who arranged the abortion was
responsible for the pregnancy of the woman was held sufficient to
establish his personal stake in the venture. Presumably, however,
such a personal stake would not exist in the routine counselling
situation.
B. Culpability as an Accomplice of the Abortee
In those cases in which the evidence has been held insufficient
to support conviction of an individual as an aider and abettor to
abortion where the principle offender was the abortionist, there was
no issue before the court as to whether the individual who assisted
in making arrangements could be convicted as an accomplice to the
offense of unlawfully procuring an abortion. In several states the
woman upon whom the abortion is performed may be charged with
soliciting or submitting to an unlawful abortion."' In such an in-
stance, it is possible that the counsellor may be charged as an ac-
complice to her offense. But here as well, the principles discussed
above would pertain - i.e., if the counsellor has a personal stake,
financial or otherwise, in the outcome of the woman's effort to
obtain an abortion, the chances of his conviction as an accomplice
are increased.
In jurisdictions where the participation of the woman is con-
sidered innocent or noncriminal and the counsellor is concerned
solely with assisting the woman, it is unlikely that any conviction
of the counsellor would be possible. This conclusion derives from
the established principle that "there can be no conviction for aid-
ing and abetting someone to do an innocent act."92  On the other
hand, if there is a community of interest between the counsellor
and the party performing an illegal abortion, the innocence of the
woman will not save the counsellor from the risk of conviction as
an accessory to the abortionist.
IV. ADDITIONAL HAZARDS OF
ABORTION COUNSELLING
The manner in which an abortion counselling service operates,
bears not only upon the extent to which its participants are subjected
90 266 Mass. 391, 399-401 (1929).
91 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-212 (1956); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.19
(1963); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.020 (1961). See also George, supra note 14,
at 723-24 & n.89 (1972); Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d 858 (1970).
9 2 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262, 265 (1963).
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to prosecution as accessories, but also upon the seriousness of other
risks. For obvious reasons, those services which not only provide
information, but also, and for a fee, make specific arrangements
for the performance of the abortion invite the greatest possibility
of legal interference. 3
A. Commercial Services: Some Special Problems
Judicial hostility to abortion counselling services that operate
for a profit has been strongly in evidence. For example, in State v.
Abortion Information Agency, Inc., a temporary injunction was
obtained in New York restraining a commercial abortion counsel-
ling service "from transacting business as a referral agency for per-
forming abortions."91  The agency operated by advertising, receiv-
ing telephone calls from women who wished to have abortions per-
formed, advising the woman how an abortion might be obtained,
informing the caller of the probable cost of the physician and hos-
pital services, and charging the caller a fee for the referral and the
operation.95
Women who used the service entered licensed hospitals and
were examined and treated by licensed physicians. Nonetheless,
the activities of the agency were found to be illegal on the follow-
ing grounds: (1) the agency was acting as an intermediary or
broker in the sale of professional services in violation of the public
policy of the state;9 6 (2) the agency was engaged in fee splitting
contrary to the law and public policy of the state;97 and (3) the
agency was engaged in the unauthorized practice of medicine which,
according to the court, involved some effort at determining the type
of operation to be performed upon the women seeking abortions.9
9 3 As discussed earlier, actual arrangement of an abortion would constitute action
rather than speech and would not be protected under the first amendment. See notes
16-18 supra & accompanying text.
94 37 App. Div. 2d 142, 143 (1971).
95 The fee included a charge for all of the services, including the operation. The
agency, not the patient, was billed by the hospital. Id.
961d. at 143-44. Later in the opinion, the court stated that "it is quite dear that
plaintiff has made out a clear and convincing case concerning the inherent dangers to
the public involved in this situation, considering the distinct probability of domina-
tion by the agency of the instiutions." Id. at 144.
971d. Interestingly the court deemed irrelevant the fact that the fee splitting did not
result in an increase in the cost to the patient. Id.
98 Id. at 145. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Steuer found that "there is absolutely
no proof that the defendant is practicing or ever has practiced medicine .... The de-
fendant makes no diagnosis, does not determine what operation is to be performed, does
not perform it, and has nothing to do with the way it is performed or [how] the pa-
tient is treated thereafter." Id. at 147-48. In Judge Steuer's view, the practice of med-
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As a final justification for its decision, the court concluded that the
agency was engaging in the unlicensed (and hence illegal) selling
of insurance by providing abortion services at a "guaranteed flat
charge that cover[edi everything.""
The decision of the court bristles with hostility to the defen-
dant's money-making activities. Indeed, the court concluded that
the agency had "the appearance of one conceived in fraud," simply
because its announced purpose, contained in the certificate of in-
corporation, was
[t]o provide general information concerning legal abortions to the
public and to women with problem pregnancies. The corporation,
nor its agents, shall not [sic] undertake to diagnose pregnancy,
or any other physical or mental condition of a client. The corpo-
ration shall not undertake to advise a client on the medical desirabil-
ity of obtaining an abortion, nor shall it provide any information or
perform any act which may constitute the practice of medicine.100
Fraud was inferred from the fact that, despite this assertion of
purpose, a business was developed which engaged "extensively in the
procurement of hospital services and .. .arrangements for abor-
tions."''1 1 The court further concluded, although without pointing
to any supporting evidence, that the defendant actually solicited
and encouraged women to seek out abortions. Although the initial
contact was always established as a result of a call from the wom-
an, this fact was considered inconsequential:
That the initial inquiry concerning the abortion is made by the pa-
tient does not negate the fact that the defendants' methodology once
a patient contacted it was to further encourage the abortion, for
the sole motive of financial gain to defendants, rather than to aid
in giving objective and concerned advice to the patient.1 2
The conclusion that the agency was operating in violation of
public policy derives from a plain and obvious antagonism to the
profit-making nature of the agency's business.'03 This attitude was
icine did not encompass the activities engaged in by the agency; nor could he find any
basis for the claim of fee splitting: "There is not even a suggestion that any doctor or
hospital ever rebated any part of his fee or its charges to defendant or offered defend-
ant an inducement of any kind to send patients to it." Id. at 148.
As to the general public policy issue, Judge Steuer believed that it was an as yet un-
determined factual question whether or not the agency was in a position, contrary to
public policy, to dominate professional activity by substantially affecting the number and
kind of patients admitted to a hospital. Id. at 150.
99 Id. at 145.
100 Id. at 145-46.
101 Id. at 146.
102 Id.
103 See id. at 147-50 (Judge Steuer, dissenting).
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expressed by the trial court in unambiguous terms: "The law which
sought to emancipate women from servitude as unwilling breeders,
did not intend to deliver them as helpless victims of commercial
operators for the exploitation of their misery.'1 .0 4
It is not unlikely that commercial referral agencies in other states
may meet similar fates, if not similar rhetoric. Several courts have
suggested that the practice of medicine should be protected from
commercial exploitation. 5 It has been held to be against public
policy, for example, to permit a "middleman" to intervene for prof-
it in establishing the professional relationships between physicians
and the public. 06 Such languuage parallels the charge leveled
in Abortion Information Agency, Inc. that the agency was acting, in
violation of public policy, as an intermediary or broker in the sale
of professional services, and suggests that the commercial agencies
may be in jeopardy.
Indeed, in the State of New York hostility towards commercial
referral agencies was so intense that legislation was enacted to abol-
ish these businesses. 0 7 Whether such broad, prohibitory legislation
can be successfully challenged remains to be seen. The state dearly
has the authority under its police power to prohibit business activi-
ties rationally deemed inimical to the public welfare. But no Su-
preme Court case has yet been decided under such a public welfare
notion where the operators of the business could claim their activity
was entitled to first amendment protection. 08
If the general right to engage in business was all that was at
stake, then the proscription of for-profit referral agencies would
almost certainly be upheld as a rational legislative action, particu-
larly when one considers the complaints typically directed at the
agencies. Before the statutory ban on profit-making referral agen-
cies was enacted in New York, the state had initiated a wide-spread
investigation into the activities of commercial referral services. It
was claimed by the New York Attorney General that the agencies
104 Id. at 149.
105See, e.g., Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 10 Cal. App. 2d 592, 52 P.2d
992 (1935); Parker v. Bd. of Dental Examiners, 216 Cal. 285, 298, 14 P.2d 67, 72
(1932).
106 Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 10 Cal. App. 2d 592, 52 P.2d 992 (1935).
107 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw §§ 4400-03 (McKinney Supp. 1971). The statute dis-
criminates between nonprofit and for-profit agencies, the latter being absolutely banned.
This discrimination survived constitutional challenge in S.P.S. Consultants v. Lefkowitz,
333 F. Supp. 1373 (1971).
108 Such a first amendment claim was raised and rejected by a lower federal court
in S.P.S. Consultants v. Lefkowitz, 333 F. Supp. 1373 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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engaged in deceptive advertising and failed to inform women of
the true cost of the referral service. It was also claimed that the
agencies illegally split their fees with the physicians and clinics per-
forming the abortions.109
But if the referral agency can establish a first amendment claim
- in addition to the general, but unpersuasive claim of the right
to do business - then more than a mere "rational-basis" justifica-
tion for the legislative prohibition would be required. If the agency's
activity constitutes speech, the validity of the proscriptive statute
might turn on whether the state's interest in regulating the medi-
cal practice or eliminating the particular evils complained of is suf-
ficient to justify the curtailment of first amendment rights. The
fact that the state might eliminate abuses by regulation rather than
by banning the agencies in toto would then be critical, for if regu-
lation would suffice, there would seem to be insufficient justification
for the infringement upon first amendment rights presented by a
total prohibition, such as the one established by the New York leg-
islation. 110
B. Subpoenas
During the New York State Attorney General's investigation
there was substantial litigation regarding issues of great importance
to the counselling business, whether commercial or nonprofit.
One issue that arose involved the right to subpoena hospital records
containing the names and addresses of all patients referred by abor-
tion counselling services, the type of operation performed, the name
and address of the treating physician, and the duration of the stay,
of the patients. In Montwill Corp. v. Lefkowitz, the New York
County Supreme Court held that the request for this information
constituted "a proper demand and a valid exercise of the power
vested in the Attorney-General.""' The doctor-patient privilege
asserted by the hospital was held to cover only information re-
garding the type of abortion performed. Furthermore, the court
refused to impose formal conditions upon release of the informa-
tion sought in order to keep the names of patients confidential.
It felt "assured that the Attorney General [wouldi not release or
109 See generally Chariton, supra note 2.
110 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965): "[A] 'govern-
mental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regula-
tion may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and hereby in-
vade the area of protected freedoms.' NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307."
111 66 Misc. 2d 724, 725, 321 N.Y.S.2d 975, 976 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct. 1971).
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make any public disclosure of the names of patients who have ob-
tained abortions except as to such disclosure as may be necessary in
the continued investigation... or the prosecution if any of any ac-
tion arising out of the subject investigation.""' 2
A similar result was reached in Weitzner v. Lefkowitz" 3 where
the same New Yorkcourt, speaking through a different judge, up-
held a subpoena directed at a licensed physician who sought to
withhold the names and addresses of his patients on the basis of
the physician-patient privilege. Noting that the subpoena was is-
sued in the course of an investigation into the activities of "private
abortion referral agencies engaged in the business of commercial
intermediaries or brokers between patient and doctor and patient
and hospital in connection with abortion services,""' 4 the court held
that the issuance of the subpoena by the Attorney General consti-
tuted a legitimate exercise of his authority to investigate possible
fraud and illegal business activity which might cause harm to the
public.1"5 The problems which might befall the patients whose
names would be disclosed were dismissed with the simple comment
that "the court has every confidence that the Attorney-General will
prevent unnecessary disclosures.""16
At least one New York case, however, has refused to order an
abortion referral agency to disclose the names and addresses of the
women with whom it had dealt. In Lefkowitz v. Women's Pavil-
lion, Inc.,llT the same New York County Supreme Court - now
speaking through a third judge - observed that the Attorney Gen-
eral had presented no argument regarding the relevance and neces-
sity of the names and addresses of clients who had obtained abor-
tions through the referral agency. While casting no doubt upon
the good faith of the Attorney General in conducting his investi-
gation, the court held that good faith did not constitute justification
1 2 Id. at 726, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 977.
113 66 Misc. 2d 721, 321 N.Y.S.2d 925 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct. 1971).
114 Id. at 722, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
115 In light of the fact that the court found that the names and addresses of patients
were "not confidential matters," id, at 723, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 927, it is somewhat sur-
prising that the court went to such lengths to demonstrate the closeness of the relation-
ship between the petitioner-physician and the referral agencies. The court acknowl-
edged that the physician was a part owner and chief gynecologist of one of the clinics
performing abortions for the agencies, that he was involved in setting up the referral
corporations, that he was a major stockholder in two of the corporations which re-
ferred patients to his clinic, and that he derived "substantial income from referrals re-
quiring his professional services." Id. at 722, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
"D6 Id. at 723, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
3.1 66 Misc. 2d 743, 321 N.Y.S.2d 963 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct. 1971).
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"to embark on a roving course which would result in generally pry-
ing into the affairs of any person." 118  The court then added that
the names of those who sought and received abortions are not pro-
tected by the umbrella of privilege within the meaning of the stat-
ute and judicial interpretation . . . . However, there is a delicate
balance which must be maintained. Those persons who sought
abortions approached the respondents in confidence with the intent
of maintaining secrecy and avoiding embarrassment. This presents
a proper case for the court to interfere and modify a subpoena to
protect against an undue infringement upon the rights of private
citizens .... Their right to privacy should be respected and pro-
tected. This is especially true in view of the fact that the fee ar-
rangements under investigation by the Attorney-General will still
be capable of full discovery. 119
While the New York investigations have apparently ended,
there is still the possibility that names and addresses of counsellees
may be subpoenaed in other states in an official investigation or in
civil or criminal litigation, that the privilege which exists between a
physician and patient will not be deemed to encompass this infor-
mation, and that exposure of the name of the counsellee may lead
to substantial embarrassment. Unless a privilege protecting the con-
fidentiality of such information can be successfully asserted on the
basis of an independent legal or constitutional principle, referral
agencies may be seriously jeopardizing those whom they serve.
C. Unauthorized Practice of Medicine
The question of whether abortion counselling falls within the
prohibitions against the unauthorized practice of medicine is an is-
sue which has arisen both in and out of New York. No doubt, the
threat of criminal prosecution for practicing medicine without a li-
cense has been used as a practical means of inhibiting abortion
counselling activities, but whether this approach will withstand ju-
dicial scrutiny remains to be seen. If the courts hold to the position
that the practice of medicine includes only physical application of
the healing arts and the prescribing of specific treatment, counsel-
ling services should be in no real jeopardy. 2 ° Indeed, this position
has been accepted by some courts. 2' The majority of courts, how-
118 Id. at 744, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 965.
119 Id. at 745, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 965 (citations omitted).
120 Most counselling agencies do not actually prescribe or administer treatment.
There are, however, those which have found themselves in extremely embarrassing po-
sitions because they dispensed tranquilizers to their clients.
121 See, e.g., State Electro-Medical Institute v. State, 74 Neb. 40, 103 N.W. 1078
(1905).
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ever, have upheld statutes or regulations providing that any person
who owns, maintains, operates, or manages a medical office is also
engaged in the practice of medicine and must have a license there-
for. -2  Presumably, such statutes are designed to protect the pub-
lic against unqualified medical practitioners, and it has been the the-
ory of most courts that such protection would be vitiated if the
standards of ethics, the class of workmanship, and the price of ser-
vices were subject to the control of lay managers.'
In those cases where management or operation of the "business
side" does not include the exercise of any control or direction of the
professional work, however, the lay manager has generally not been
held to be practicing medicine.'2' Thus, in Messner v. Board of
Dental Examiners, where the evidence showed only that the layman
was the credit and advertising manager, that he superintended the
laboratory to the extent of seeing that the work went out on time,
and that he purchased dental and office supplies (but did not deter-
mine the grade or character of supplies to be ordered), the court
found that he did not control the professional service and, conse-
quently, was not practicing medicine.' 5 On the other hand, in
lForlton v. Davis,'26 the Supreme Court of Idaho held that a lay
12 2 See State v. Boren, 36 Wash. 2d. 522, 219 P.2d 566, appeal dismissed, 340
U.S. 881 (1950) (wherein the court held constitutional as a reasonable exercise of the
police power a statute that a "person practices dentistry" within the meaning of cer-
tain license requirements if he "owns, maintains or operates an office for the practice of
dentistry"); Taber v. State Bd. of Registration and Examination in Dentistry, 1 N.J.
343, 63 A.2d 535, appeal dismissed, 337 U.S. 922 (1949). See also Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d
808, 810 (1951).
In the absence of specific statutory provision to the contrary, it is well settled that
neither a corporation nor any other unlicensed person may engage, directly or indi-
rectly, in the practice of medicine. See Annor., 4 A.L.R.3d 383, 385 (1965). See also
Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 10 Cal. App. 2d 592, 52 P.2d 992 (1935) and cases
cited id. at 594-95, 52 P.2d at 993-94. As of 1965, professional corporations or associ-
ations had been authorized by statute in 31 states. Annot., 4 A.L.L3d 383, 387-88
(1965). Of course, such statutes do not enable unlicensed practitioners to incorporate
for the purpose of operating a medical practice.
123 See, e.g., State v. Williams, 211 Ind. 186, 5 N.E.2d 961 (1937); Parker v. Bd.
of Dental Examiners, 216 Cal. 285, 14 P.2d 67 (1932). Alternatively, the courts have
felt that the practice of medicine should not be subject to commercial exploitation, at
least not by persons other than licensed physicians. See, e.g., Pac. Employers Ins. Co.
v. Carpenter, 10 Cal. App. 2d 592, 595, 52 P.2d 992, 994 (1935).
124 But see Parker v. Bd. of Dental Examiners, 216 Cal. 285, 14 P.2d 67 (1932).
125 87 Cal. App. 199, 262 P. 58 (1927). The court reached this result even
though the manager in question shared in the profits of the office.
Had it been shown, [however], that [the manager] had authority to partici-
pate in the employment or discharge of those engaged to do professional work
and the fixing of their compensation a different question would arise. The
power to hire and discharge and to fix the compensation of an employee neces-
sarily implies the power to control his work. Id. at 204-05, 262 P. at 60.
126 73 Idaho 217,249 P.2d 810 (1952).
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manager was engaged in the practice of medicine where he exer-
cised control as a partner in determining who should be employed
by the partnership and in determining remuneration of employees.
Thus, the test generally focuses on the degree of lay control over
the professional services. If the layman exercises some power to
hire, discharge, and fix the compensation of licensed practitioners,
then he is likely to be considered to be practicing medicine without
a license. If the control test is applied to counselling agencies, a
similar result will obtain in those circumstances where the agency
exercises such control and supervision over the physicians who ac-
tually perform the operations. In most cases, however, there is no
such authority exercised by the counselling services.12 Nor is there
any actual dispensation of medical advice, medication, or treatment
as would ordinarily be involved in the practice of medicine. Even
where the agency makes an initial determination of the probable
kind of operation necessary and refers the woman to an appropriate
clinic, if a final and independent determination of the kind of oper-
ation to be performed is made by a licensed physician, then little
more is being offered by the referral agency than information about
and easier access to the needed medical services. Since the medi-
cal practice statutes are presumably not intended to deprive the pub-
lic of legitimate medical services or information regarding the avail-
ability of medical services, there would seem to be scant justifica-
tion for holding that such agencies are engaged in the unauthor-
ized practice of medicine. -8
V. CONCLUSION
In many ways, the law has taken an approach to abortion coun-
selling services which is intentionally designed to limit the public's
access to information regarding the availability of abortions. By
assuming this posture, the law has done nothing more than impose
restrictions upon the uninformed. Those in the worst position to
pay for a service which they consider necessary may be forced to
pay the highest price for that service. The pressures which have
been generated by the law have intimidated principally those who
1
2 7 A distinction may be drawn, however, in the case of referral agencies which are
able to obtain discounts in the price of the abortion operation. Conceivably, the ability
to obtain a discount may be read to imply that the agency exercises control over the com-
pensation of the licensed physician sufficient to bring it within the proscriptions of
the unauthorized practice statutes.
128 Of course, when such agencies charge a fee for their services, which fee includes
the price of the operation itself, the agency may be labeled a "'broker" of medical ser-
vices.
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claim to be motivated by high purpose - those who see abortion
counselling as a means of protecting the freedom of the individual
and of dealing in a limited way with the enormous problems caused
by the population explosion. Those who appear to be motivated by
less lofty concerns have done a substantial service, if service is to be
measured in terms of dissemination of desired information. Regard-
less of the motives of the counselling agencies, there is little or
no justification for withholding information from the public re-
garding the availability of abortion services. There is equally little
justification for the intimidation that derives from the ambiguities
created by statutes and judicial decisions applicable to abortion coun-
selling activities.
